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1. Introduction 
During the last decade, supply chain management (SCM), a management approach that 
emphasizes the importance of building and managing relationships among partner firms in a 
supply chain, has received considerable attention in research and practice. SCM is concerned 
with managing the upstream and downstream relationships between suppliers and customers, to 
deliver superior customer value at the least cost to the chain as a whole (Christopher 1998). On 
the other hand, the importance of quality and its associated benefits such as improvements in 
customer satisfaction and in the bottom-line have been well acknowledged (e.g., Hendricks and 
Singhal 1997). For instance, the quality of logistics services has been recognized as an area in 
which firms can attain a competitive edge (Mentzer, Flint and Hult 2001). Given the growing 
trend towards developing and maintaining mutually beneficial exchanges in buyer-supplier 
relationships, the aspect of quality management of the supply chain is receiving increased 
attention in the literature (e.g., Forker 1997; Stanley and Wisner 2001). 
 
The success of a supply chain depends not only on efficiency from optimizing resources, 
but also on the effectiveness of partner firms in carrying out mutually beneficial activities, i.e., 
meeting customer requirements at the lowest possible cost (Lai, Ngai and Cheng 2002). To 
achieve business success, it is imperative for firms to excel in quality, on which the efficient and 
effective flows of goods and information in the supply chain depend. We therefore attempt to fill 
this gap in the research by developing and testing a framework that looks into how relationship 
stability is linked to the supplier’s commitment to quality for the buyer firm in a two-stage 
supply chain within the framework of transaction cost analysis (TCA). The impact of various 
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transaction characteristics that take place between the supplier and buyer firms and how they 
might affect the strength of the link are empirically examined. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1 Quality and the supply chain 
The successful implementation of SCM requires integrating internal functions of a firm 
and effectively linking them with the external operations of its partner firms in the supply chain 
(Holmberg 2002). To ensure quality in these processes, it is necessary to understand the meaning 
of quality because different parties in the supply chain might view quality differently. Garvin 
(1984) suggested that definitions of quality could be classified into the following categories: 
transcendent, product-based, user-based, manufacturing-based, and value-based. Reeves and 
Bednar (1994) viewed quality differently as excellence, value, conformance, and meeting and/ or 
exceeding the buyer’s expectations. Although there are different interpretations of quality, they 
are all geared towards the goal of meeting the customer’s requirements. Stanley and Wisner 
(2001) examined the association between the implementation of cooperative purchasing/supplier 
relationships, the quality of internal services, and an organization’s ability to provide quality 
products and services to its customers. Their study found support for the view that strengthening 
the relationship between the buyer and the supplier improves an organization’s ability to deliver 
quality to customers. They suggested that managers should assess buyer-supplier relationships 
and take action where necessary to increase communication, solve problems, and increase 
general awareness of the relationship between internal and external services and product quality. 
From this perspective, quality in the supply chain can be defined as conformance to mutually 
agreed-upon requirements among the partner firms with the aim of improving the performance of 
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the transactions taking place in the chain. It involves agreements on specifications, exchanges of 
information, coordination and control between the buyer and supplier firm at the inter-
organizational level that could affect the quality (conformance to requirements) of the delivery of 
the product or service, and the ability to achieve quality in the supply chain. 
 
2.2 Relationship stability and supplier commitment to quality 
As a supply chain consists of a network of suppliers, their input is essential to ensuring 
the quality of the products/services desired by the customers. The main challenge for the buyer 
firm is to develop dependable buyer-supplier relationships and to elicit the commitment of 
suppliers to assure the quality of the products/services they provide. Because stability in the 
buyer-supplier relationship affects a supplier’s commitment to quality, it is important that such a 
relationship be properly understood. The link between relationship stability and supplier 
commitment to quality and the contingencies of the strength of the link to transaction 
characteristics are illustrated in Figure 1 and are detailed below. 
 
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
 
The importance of interorganizational relationships to achieving cost and service 
advantages has been widely acknowledged in the literature (e.g., Cannon and Homburg 2001). 
For instance, in his concept of lean supply, Lamming (1993) emphasized closer working 
relationships and transparent flows of information along the supply chain such that buyers can 
obtain the right quality of products/services at the right price, while suppliers can provide a 
quality supply profitably. Maloni and Benton (2000) tested a model on the influence of power in 
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the supply chain. Their findings suggest that a stronger buyer-supplier relationship boosts 
performance throughout the supply chain. Recently, Fynes and Voss (2002) found that the buyer-
supplier relationship has a moderating effect on quality practices and design quality. Their results 
suggested that it is desirable for suppliers to cultivate closer links with buyers to improve the 
quality of designs and related measures of quality performance.  
To attain quality in the supply chain, it is essential to develop a stable buyer-supplier 
relationship, which requires the firms involved work beyond organizational boundaries to 
improve performance throughout the supply chain. The stability of relationships goes beyond a 
simple, positive evaluation of the other party based on considerations of the current benefits and 
costs associated with the relationship. It implies the adoption of a long-term orientation towards 
the relationship – a willingness to make short-term sacrifices to realize the long-term benefits of 
the relationship (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987). Therefore, for the buyer firm, the supplier’s 
commitment to quality can be viewed as a long-term orientation in the buyer-supplier 
relationship. It requires a stable buyer-supplier relationship that will last long enough for the 
supplier firm to invest in a quality improvement system to meet the buyer’s requirements and for 
both parties to realize the long-term benefits. Firms that form strong relationships with suppliers 
can better align their interests and goals with those of their suppliers (Lamming and Hampson 
1996). Accordingly, a stable relationship instils confidence in the supplier firm and engages its 
commitment to meet the buyer’s requirements through mutually beneficial exchanges. We 
therefore envisage that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship stability as perceived by supplier firms is positively related to 
their commitment to quality for their buyer firms.  
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2.3 Transaction characteristics and supplier commitment to quality  
 The basic premise of TCA is that the costs of conducting transactions, i.e. the costs of 
economic exchange, could be too high under certain conditions. In such cases, organizing an 
economic transaction within the firm (or hierarchy) is a better alternative than organizing it using 
the market mechanism. While TCA has been instrumental in economic theory for explaining the 
choice of governance mechanism for organizing economic transactions, i.e., hierarchy vs. market, 
it is useful to SCM research in predicting buyer-supplier relationships and the associated 
performance outcomes. The TCA approach to economic exchange posits that three critical 
dimensions characterize transactions: 1) the degree to which specific assets are incurred; 2) the 
frequency with which transactions recur, and 3) uncertainty (Williamson 1979). Two key 
assumptions characterize TCA: bounded rationality and opportunism (Rindfleisch and Heide 
1997). The existence of bounded rationality and opportunism gives rise to transaction costs in the 
form of monitoring behaviour, safeguarding assets, and ensuring that the other party does not 
engage in opportunistic behaviour. When transactions recur, involve high transaction-specific 
investments, or entail opportunistic behaviour, transaction costs will be likely (Grover and 
Malhotra 2003). Therefore, we argue that the strength of the link between relationship stability 
and the supplier’s commitment to quality is affected by the transaction characteristics and the 
potential transaction costs that will be incurred. In particular, we suggest that the relationship 
stability – supplier commitment to quality (RSTAB-SCQUA) link may not remain the same in 
strength under different transaction characteristics. The contingencies of the link on transaction 
characteristics are elaborated on below. 
 
 Asset specificity may serve to tie partner firms together by subverting the flexibility of 
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pursuing other alternatives in the supply chain. Asset specificity encompasses specialized 
equipment and facilities (e.g., electronic data interchange systems), as well as specialized 
training and experience (e.g., management procedures), which have little or no value outside the 
focal exchange relationship (Williamson 1985) and cannot be transferred easily to another chain 
(Anderson and Weitz 1986). As specific assets lose value upon transfer, exchange partners may 
become committed to making the existing relationships succeed (Parkhe 1993). As a result, a 
supplier may become locked into a relationship with a buyer firm if it devotes specific assets to 
the relationship. One major reason for supplier firms to invest in specific assets is to signal their 
loyalty with respect to the exchange relationship with their buyer firms (Mishra, Heide and Cort 
1998). In other words, supplier firms invest in specific assets to ensure a continued relationship 
with the buyer firms by demonstrating their loyalty to the relationship of exchange. However, as 
specific assets are difficult to redeploy, suppliers may also request protective clauses to prevent 
buyer firms from prematurely terminating the relationship of exchange. By investing in specific 
assets, supplier firms can show the buyer firms that the former can be counted upon to fulfill 
supply functions that are essential to the relationship, that the relationship will continue, and that 
they are committed to the relationship (Buchanan 1992). Similarly, specific investment 
commitments by buyer firms will also signify a more stable relationship and motivate suppliers 
to assure quality for their buyer firms. Therefore, we predict that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the asset specificity between the suppliers and buyers, the stronger is 
the positive relationship between the relationship stability as perceived by supplier firms and 
their commitment to quality for their buyer firms.  
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The frequency of transactions is one characteristic of transactions that might lead to the 
incurring of transaction costs because, in the case of few and non-recurring transactions, it is 
difficult to recover the cost of the specialized governance structures of the hierarchies 
(Williamson 1979). This notion suggests that, as transactions increase in frequency, supplier 
firms have more of an incentive to invest and to commit themselves to a strong, long-term 
relationship with their buyer firms, and vice versa. This is because the investments in hierarchies 
that reduce the costs of transactions can be justified by the frequent transactions in the supply 
relationship. The willingness to develop a long-term relationship will reinforce stability in the 
relationship and provide incentives for supplier firms to commit to quality for buyer firms in the 
supply relationship. This logic leads us to conjecture that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the transaction frequency between the suppliers and buyers, the 
stronger is the positive relationship between the relationship stability as perceived by supplier 
firms and their commitment to quality for their buyer firms.  
Uncertainty is a function of the ability to reliably predict future events that might create 
problems with information in the exchange (Williamson 1985). Suppliers face two types of 
uncertainty: external and internal. External uncertainty is concerned with variability in the 
market such as rapidly changing technology, frequent changes in price, or variance in service and 
demand requirements (Achrol, Reve and Stem 1983). Internal uncertainty is about task 
ambiguity, i.e. the difficulty of obtaining or understanding information regarding a task or 
function; e.g., the ambiguity associated with determining a buyer’s service and demand 
requirements for a product or service (Williamson 1985). Previous research has shown that 
external uncertainty makes it more difficult to predict future contingencies (Aldrich 1979) and 
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internal uncertainty makes it more difficult to specify outcomes and measure performance 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972). As such, uncertainty of supply is likely to create transaction costs, 
and therefore discourage suppliers from committing to the buyer-supplier relationship. Put in 
another way, certainty of supply reduces transaction costs and fosters stability in the buyer-
supplier relationship; as a result, it encourages supplier firms to assure quality for buyer firms. 
Consequently, we anticipate that: 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the certainty of supply between the suppliers and buyers, the stronger 
is the positive relationship between the relationship stability as perceived by supplier firms and 
their commitment to quality for their buyer firms.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Population and samples 
To test the four hypotheses without the potential confounding effects of variation in 
organizational practices, we focus on buyer-supplier relationships involving one buyer company 
in a two-stage supply chain. Studying suppliers with a common buyer can help to minimize 
extraneous sources of variance. We collected data from a sample of supplier organizations 
reporting on their relationship with a particular buyer, a global container port terminal operator 
(referred to below as the Terminal Operator). The unit of analysis in this study was chosen to 
assess the vertical relationship between the buyer and supplier firms in a two-stage supply chain, 
rather than the purchasing and supply practices of a particular firm. We selected this particular 
vertical supply relationship because the buyer firm, i.e. the Terminal Operator, has a global 
supplier network and has demonstrated leadership in purchasing and supply practices. The 
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population was the Terminal Operator’s supplier base consisting of (N = 1,348) suppliers, which 
covered a variety of supply relations.  
 A key informant approach was used to collect data for the supply relations under study 
(Phillips and Bagozzi 1986). The informants selected were executives at the supplier firms 
(identified by the Terminal Operator) handling the supply relations with the Terminal Operator. 
By definition, an informant’s role is to report on organizational processes, events, or outcomes 
that are aggregate in nature; thus, informants should be sampled according to their knowledge of 
or involvement with the focal firm (Heide and Miner 1992). Accordingly, the informants 
sampled were heavily involved in the supply relations with the Terminal Operator. Furthermore, 
because of the sensitive nature of the information provided in the survey responses, a single key 
informant affords the advantage of anonymity, which therefore provides the respondent with a 
sense of reduced risk and increases the likelihood that he or she will respond in a candid manner 
(Kohli 1989).  
 
3.2 Measures 
Although the focal constructs in this study are, to a large extent stimulated by previous 
theories and research, the scales were developed specifically for this study. Multi-item scales 
were generated based on conceptual definitions, a review of literature, and expert interviews. In 
this study, relationship stability refers to the extent to which the buyer-supplier relationship is 
steady and both parties are engaged in an active and long-term working relationship. To measure 
perceived relationship stability from the suppliers’ perspective, we developed five items to 
operationalize the theoretical variable on the basis of interviews with experts in relationship 
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management and a review of the related literature (Davies et al. 1995, Leung, Wong and Tam 
1995; Luo 1997).  
As a container port terminal is a service-based business, the specific assets that require 
investment from suppliers are primarily intangible (e.g., time and effort in developing procedures 
and routines for supplying a particular product or service). For the most part, tangible assets 
(e.g., equipment and facilities) can be used in other supply relationships; therefore, they are not 
asset-specific. For this reason, our measures of the asset specificity of supply center on intangible 
assets. On the basis of previous research (Stump and Heide 1996), we developed five items to 
measure the asset specificity between the suppliers and the Terminal Operator. For the other 
transaction characteristics, we adopted the established measures developed by Klein (1989) and 
Heide and John (1990) to measure transaction frequency and certainty of supply with four items 
respectively for each. Suppliers’ commitment to quality can be viewed as the extent to which the 
suppliers have invested in quality-improvement measurement systems to assure the quality of 
their supply to the buyer. These include the preventive measures employed by supplier firms to 
ensure the quality (conformance of requirements) of the product and service delivered to buyer 
firms. On the basis of Lai and Cheng (2003), we developed four items to measure the suppliers’ 
commitment to quality for the buyer firm.  
The measurement items for the theoretical variables were put into a survey questionnaire, 
which was initially designed in English and translated into Chinese. To validate the equivalence 
of the translation, one person translated the questionnaire into Chinese and another back-
translated it into English (Douglas and Craig 1983). The original and back-translated versions 
were compared for conceptual equivalence and refined where necessary. The wording of specific 
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items was refined in response to feedback from a panel discussion with purchasing and supply 
academics and professionals. Further refinement of the survey questionnaire was conducted in a 
pilot test with a convenient sample of 30 suppliers of the Terminal Operator. The results from the 
assessment of item and scale reliability in the pilot test indicated that the questionnaire items 
were valid and reliable. The finalized measurement items are provided in Appendix A. 
In addition to the focal theoretical variables, three control variables were included in the 
study, namely relationship age, company size, and transaction volume, to examine the RSTAB-
SCQUA link and its hypothesized contingencies. The rationale for these control variables is 
explained briefly as follows. First, to account for the possibility that a long duration of the buyer-
supplier relationship may influence supplier behavior, we included relationship age as a control. 
Second, size of the supplier companies can influence their commitment to their buyer firms 
because this may give the suppliers a better bargaining position. We included the size of the 
supplier companies to control for this possibility. Third, a supplier’s commitment to quality can 
be derived from the volume of its transactions with the buyer firm. Therefore, transaction volume 
was included as the third control variable. The measures of these variables were categorized with 
insights from the Terminal Operator and entered as covariates in this study as follows: 
relationship age – short = “less than 4 years” and long = “4 years or more” (dummy code: short = 
0; long = 1); company size - small = “less than 500 employees” and large = “500 employees or 
more” (dummy code: small = 0; large = 1); business volume – small = “less than 1 million HK$” 
and large = “1 million HK$ or more” (dummy code: small = 0; large =1).  
3.3 Data collection 
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Both the Chinese and English versions of the final questionnaire were sent to the 1,348 
supplier firms in the population. For each supplier firm, we solicited only one response and the 
target respondents were the managers who handle the supply relations with the Terminal 
Operator. The supplier firms were provided with a self-addressed pre-paid envelope to return the 
questionnaire. A follow-up questionnaire was mailed to the non-respondents four weeks after the 
initial mailing, followed by a letter of reminder two weeks after the follow-up mailing. To 
increase the survey response rate, several steps were undertaken. A cover letter from the 
purchasing director of the Terminal Operator supporting the research and requesting that 
suppliers cooperate with the survey was included with each questionnaire. Furthermore, the 
target respondents were assured that the study was being conducted independently by the 
researchers, and that all responses were treated confidentially and only analyzed in aggregate. 
Finally, another letter from the researchers promised the supplier firms that the individual 
responses of a supplier would never be divulged to the Terminal Operator.  
After the two mailings, 365 completed questionnaires were received - 164 in the first and 
201 in the second mailings - for a response rate of 27%. The quality of the informants was 
evaluated by a series of questionnaire items to ascertain that the target respondents met the 
criteria of being knowledgeable about the supply relations under study (Campbell 1955). This 
procedure avoided the potential bias of selection, and assured that the key informants had 
sufficient knowledge of and involvement with the Terminal Operator (Phillips 1981).  
Three items were used to assess the quality of the informants (c.f. Cusumano and 
Takeishi 1991). These items included “the knowledge you have about the supply relationship of 
your company with the Terminal Operator,” “the knowledge you have about the requirements of 
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the Terminal Operator for the items supplied by your company,” and “your involvement in the 
supply relationship of your company with the Terminal Operator is” on a five-point scale from 1 
= extremely low to 5 = extremely high. If a respondent had answered with a 4 or 5 to at least one 
of the three questions and had interacted with the supplier’s organization for more than one year, 
the respondent was considered qualified to complete the questionnaire. This rule resulted in the 
exclusion of two completed surveys from further analysis. The remaining responses to the 
informant qualification items were uniformly high, as suggested by mean ratings of 3.60, 3.82, 
and 3.88 on a five-point scale. In addition, we excluded five respondents because an excessive 
amount of data was missing on the theoretical constructs in their completed surveys. Thus, 358 
qualified responses were obtained and subsequently used for assessing the non-response bias and 
for testing the hypotheses. 
3.4 Non-response bias and common method variance 
We took several steps to check for non-response bias in our sample. First, using a 
systematic sampling of the original sampling frame, we made telephone calls to thirty non-
responding supplier firms. Each of these non-respondents was asked a random selection of items 
from the original questionnaire covering each facet of the study. No significant differences in 
these questions (p > 0.10) were found between the original respondents and our sample of thirty 
non-respondents. Second, using the database provided by the Terminal Operator, we were able to 
obtain archival data concerning sample characteristics such as the size of the company and the 
age of its relationship with the Terminal Operator. The mean differences between the responding 
and non-responding companies along these dimensions were examined using a t-test. The results 
demonstrated that all t-statistics were insignificant (p > 0.10). Finally, we examined the non-
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response bias using the procedures recommended by Armstrong and Overton (1977), whereby 
we compared the responses from the first mailing with the responses from the second mailing by 
testing for mean differences on all of the multiple-item scales in the study. No significant 
differences (p > 0.10) in the variable means between early responders and late responders were 
detected. On the basis of all of this evidence, we concluded that the non-response bias did not 
appear to be a problem with the data collected. 
The data collected were also checked for common method variance. Podsakoff and Organ 
(1986) suggested that if the variables in a study all load on one factor or if there is one factor that 
explains the majority of the variance, then common method variance may be a problem. An 
exploratory factor analysis was performed on all of the measurement items. The analysis yielded 
five significant factors (eigenvalues greater than one) explaining 73.8% of the variance (31.2%, 
14.4%, 11.6%, 9.0%, and 7.6%, respectively, for each factor), suggesting that the data were not 
explained by a single common method factor. Therefore, there appeared to be no problem with 
common method variance in the data collected. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Validity and reliability 
To validate the measurement scales, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed, 
hypothesizing that the five theoretical constructs, i.e. relationship stability (RSTAB), asset 
specificity (ASPEC), transaction frequency (TFREQ), certainty of supply (CERTS), and supplier 
commitment to quality assurance (SCQUA), would adequately fit the data collected. The results 
in Table 1 show that a five-factor measurement model fits the data acceptably. The chi-square 
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goodness-of-fit statistic was statistically significant, indicating that the model was significantly 
different from the data. However, because large samples are likely to lead the chi-square statistic 
to reject valid models (Bagozzi and Yi 1988), we relied more heavily on other statistics of fit: the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), Tucker-
Lewis Index (TLI), and the Root Mean Square Residual (RMR). These statistics suggested that 
the data fit the measurement model reasonably well (χ2 = 442.50; df = 199; CFI = 0.95; GFI = 
0.90; NFI; 0.92; TLI = 0.95; RMR = 0.05). All of the measurement items also significantly 
loaded on the constructs on which they were hypothesized to load. The composite reliability 
coefficient (CR) for each of these multi-item constructs, ranging from 0.84 to 0.95, exceeded the 
threshold of 0.60 necessary to measure reliability (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). In addition, the 
average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct surpassed the 0.50 threshold for adequate fit 
(Bagozzi and Yi 1988). As the largest correlation between the constructs was 0.43, which was 
significantly less than unity; this finding provided evidence of the discriminant validity of these 
measures (Phillips 1981). All these results give us confidence that the measures are indeed valid 
and reliable. 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
To further assess discriminant validity, we assessed pairs of scales in a series of two-
factor confirmatory models. Following the procedure described by Joreskog (1971), we specified 
the two-factor models by restricting the factor intercorrelations to unity and then performed χ2 
difference tests (with 1 degree of freedom on the values obtained for the constrained and 
unconstrained models. A significantly lower χ2 value for the unconstrained model would indicate 
that the traits are not perfectly correlated, and that discriminant validity is achieved (Bagozzi and 
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Phillips 1982). The results in Table 2 show that the five constructs were significantly different 
from one another, providing further evidence of discriminant validity for the measures. The 
summary statistics and intercorrelations for all of the five constructs are given in Table 3. 
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here > 
4.2 Regression Analysis  
Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses, including the 
hypothesized effects of transaction characteristics on the RSTAB-SCQUA link. To reduce the 
problem of multicollinearity between the predictors and the interaction terms containing these 
predictors, we employed the mean centering technique in model 3; i.e., the raw score minus the 
mean of the independent variables (Aiken and West 1991). We also examined variance inflation 
factors (VIF) to determine the existence of multicollinearity. The largest of the resulting VIF 
scores in all of the models given in Table 4 was 1.57; i.e., well below the maximum level of 10.0 
suggested by Mason and Perreault (1991), indicating that multicollinearity should not be a 
problem with our data.  
Proceeding with the hierarchical models, we first predicted SCQUA using only RSTAB. 
The results are shown in Table 4. As expected, a highly significant positive effect was observed. 
Next, we added the three variables, i.e., ASPEC, TFREQ, and CERTS. Recall that we refrained 
from offering main effect hypotheses for these variables. Nevertheless, to be conservative, we 
included them in the empirical specifications. The results showed that R2 increased significantly 
from Model 1 to Model 2, indicating a significant main effect. However, the interpretation of 
these main effects was ambiguous because our theory specifies interaction effects. The third 
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estimated model, Model 3, included the interaction effects of the transaction characteristics on 
the RSTAB-SCQUA link. The increase in R2 from Model 2 to Model 3 was marginally 
significant with the addition of the hypothesized interactions of CERTS with RSTAB on 
SCQUA. Each of the hypotheses and the test results are discussed below. 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
The results in Table 4 show that RSTAB as perceived by supplier firms is positively 
related to SCQUA. This evidence lends support to Hypothesis 1 and provides support for the role 
of relationship stability in fostering the commitment of suppliers to providing quality for the 
buyer firm. Contrary to our hypotheses, both asset specificity and transaction frequency do not 
significantly interact with RSTAB on the link. The results reject Hypotheses 2 and 3, and seem 
to suggest that, once established and maintained, the strength of the RSTAB-SCQUA link 
remains unchanged regardless of asset specificity and transaction frequency. The next 
contingency we proposed, i.e. certainty of supply, was found to interact significantly with 
RSTAB, and this interaction was positively linked to SCQUA (p < 0.05, Model 3). This provides 
evidence to support Hypothesis 4. The results show that RSTAB plays a stronger role in 
increasing SCQUA if suppliers’ perceived certainty of supply with the buyer firm is greater.  
5. Discussion and implications 
This study represents one of the first empirical studies to explore the link between 
relationship stability and supplier commitment to quality. It contributes to the literature in several 
important ways. First, this study examines quality management in a supply chain, a critical yet 
under-explored subject in SCM research. This issue is of particular interest from the standpoint 
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of the development of theories for the disciplines of both quality management and SCM. 
Although buyer-supplier relationship is a well-established research area, there is a lack of 
empirical research in the SCM literature examining buyer-supplier relationship and the 
associated performance implications. The results of this study shed light on the importance of 
managing relationships with suppliers in terms of ensuring their commitment to quality, and on 
how transaction characteristics will affect the strength of the RSTAB-SCQUA link. In this regard, 
we examined the contingencies of the RSTAB-SCQUA link on transaction characteristics using 
a TCA framework. The theoretical lens of the TCA framework is extended to quality 
management and SCM research. 
In sum, this study has addressed whether relationship stability as perceived by supplier 
firms is related to their commitment to quality for their buyer firms. In addition to providing 
evidence of the RSTAB-SCQUA link, this study aids the understanding of the subtleties of how 
the strength of the link varies with transaction characteristics. We view this as an important issue 
because it helps advance our understanding of the circumstances under which the relationship 
stability becomes more critical to a supplier’s commitment to quality. Taking a contingency 
perspective, this study proposes transaction characteristics within a TCA framework that affect 
the strength of the RSTAB-SCQUA link. With respect to our principal hypothesis, we found 
strong empirical support for a positive cross-sectional relationship between RSTAB and 
SCQUA. When RSTAB is high, SCQUA is likely to be enhanced. We also found some empirical 
evidence that this RSTAB-SCQUA link is affected by CERTS in a positive manner, but not by 
ASPEC and TFREQ. One plausible reason for the lack of impact from ASPEC on the link is that 
investment in specific assets, although possibly helpful in allowing both buyer and supplier firms 
to signal their loyalty to the supply relationship, provides no further clues for supplier firms to 
 20
understand the requirements of the buyer firms and, therefore, ensure the quality of their supply. 
The insignificant impact of TFREQ on the link is possibly due to the ambiguity of the factor of 
transaction frequency for supplier firms to conform to buyer requirements and quality 
improvement in the supply relationship. Nevertheless, the presence of certainty of supply 
enhances the strength of the link. Suppliers facing a higher level of certainty of supply exhibit a 
stronger relationship between their perceived relationship stability and their commitment to 
quality for their buyer firms. One effect of certainty of supply is that it heightens a supplier’s 
interest in understanding the buyer’s requirements, which will motivate the supplier to make 
greater efforts to ensure quality in the supply relationship. By removing the issue of uncertainty 
of supply, the buyer firms gives suppliers a strong incentive to perform well, so the latter will be 
more committed to quality. SCQUA appears to be shaped by relationship stability with the buyer 
firm, which is attenuated by increased CERTS in the supply relationship.  
There are several managerial implications from the study findings. First, buyers can use 
our research framework as a check on the adequacy of the stability of their relationship with their 
suppliers. In doing so, they are advised to foster stability in the buyer-supplier relationship. It 
may make sense for buyer firms to establish policy guidelines to increase the certainty of supply 
for suppliers and to build relationships with them, thereby increasing the latter’s commitment to 
quality. This study strongly suggests that buyer firms need to make concerted efforts to develop a 
stable relationship with their suppliers in order to encourage a commitment to quality on the part 
of the suppliers. This implies that when a firm desires to assure the quality of supplier inputs, 
there is a need to develop a stable relationship with suppliers. Not only is it important for a firm 
to focus on relationship stability with suppliers, which has a direct impact on the supplier’s 
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commitment to quality, a firm must also recognize the contingency of certainty of supply on the 
RSTB-SCQUA link.  
6. Directions for further research 
There are several limitations to this study that should be taken into consideration and we 
leave them as topics for further research. First, because of its cross-sectional design, the RSTAB-
SCQUA link on a temporal dimension cannot be established from this study. A longitudinal 
study is needed to complement this study. Second, as we collected data only from supplier firms, 
the data offered might have a self-reported, one-dimensional focus. Although we provided a 
reasonable test of the potential existence of the common method bias, it is at best post hoc and its 
results should not be interpreted unequivocally (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). Therefore, further 
research should be attempted to obtain data on the RSTAB-SCQUA link and its contingent 
variables from multiple sources, using various methods. For instance, the success of emerging 
paradigms like SCM depends on a firm’s ability to collaborate with different parties in the 
supply chain. It is desirable to conduct further research employing a dyadic methodology and to 
collect data from different parties in a supply chain. It is also useful to examine the RSTAB-
SCQUA link beyond a two-stage vertical relationship and to collect data from different echelons 
of a supply chain (e.g., suppliers’ suppliers). Finally, this study represents an important step in 
the direction of seeking an understanding of the buyer-supplier relationship and its effects on 
quality management in SCM research. To enhance the generalizability of the results to other 
industrial settings, further research should be conducted to investigate the contingency of the 
RSTAB-SCQUA link in other business contexts; e.g., wholesaling and retailing. 
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Appendix A - Measurement items 
RSTAB Relationship Stability; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree 
1 We attempt to maintain harmony with the Terminal Operator. 
2 Our frequent cooperation with the Terminal Operator reduces most business misunderstandings. 
3 We maintain a good relationship with the Terminal Operator to obtain more business. 
4 We maintain a good relationship with the Terminal Operator to build up our reputation/ image. 
5 We maintain a good relationship with the Terminal Operator for smooth contractual 
arrangements. 
ASPEC Asset Specificity; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree 
1 The procedures and routines we have developed for the items supplied to the Terminal Operator 
are tailored to the Terminal Operator’s particular situation. 
2 The Terminal Operator has some tailor-made norms that have required extensive adaptation by 
us. 
3 We have spent significant resources to ensure that the specifications of the items supplied to the 
Terminal Operator fit well with the Terminal Operator’s operational capability. 
4 Our people and facilities have been tailored to provide the items sold to the Terminal Operator. 
5 Most of the training we have undertaken to meet the Terminal Operator’s requirements cannot be 
easily adapted for use by another customer. 
TFREQ Transaction Frequency; 1 = extremely low to 5 = extremely high 
1 Compared to other large customers, the average number of orders by the Terminal Operator is 
2 Compared to other large customers, the average number of shipments to the Terminal Operator is 
3 Compared to other large customers, the average number of items sold to the Terminal Operator is 
4 Compared to other large customers, the average size of an order sold to the Terminal Operator is 
CERTS Certainty of Supply; 1 = extremely difficult to 5 = extremely easy (reverse code) 
1 Forecasting our sales volume to the Terminal Operator is 
2 Forecasting the Terminal Operator’s demand requirements for the items we supply is 
3 Forecasting the Terminal Operator’s order size is 
4 Forecasting the Terminal Operator’s order cycle is 
SCQUA Supplier Commitment to Quality; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree 
1 We continually evaluate and improve the products/ services we supply to the Terminal Operator. 
2 We continually evaluate and improve our business processes to meet the requirements of the 
Terminal Operator. 
3 We continually manage data/ information to support efforts to improve the quality of our supplies 
to the Terminal Operator. 
4 We employ procedures to ensure reliability, consistency, and rapid access to data and 
information for our supplies to the Terminal Operator. 
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Figure 1. Relationship stability, supplier commitment to quality, and transaction characteristics 
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Table 1. Results of confirmatory factor analysis 
 Constructs 
Measurement 
items 
RSTAB ASPEC TFREQ CERTS SCQUA 
RSTAB1 0.57 a     
RSTAB2 0.55     
RSTAB3 0.92     
RSTAB4 0.89     
RSTAB5 0.88     
ASPEC1  0.69 a    
ASPEC2  0.72    
ASPEC3  0.81    
ASPEC4  0.81    
ASPEC5  0.51    
TFREQ1   0.91 a   
TFREQ2   0.90   
TFREQ3   0.82   
TFREQ4   0.80   
CERTS1    0.76 a  
CERTS2    0.75  
CERTS3    0.88  
CERTS4    0.87  
SCQUA1     0.85 a 
SCQUA2     0.88 
SCQUA3     0.95 
SCQUA4     0.94 
Alpha 0.87 0.83 0.92 0.89 0.95 
CR 0.88 0.84 0.92 0.89 0.95 
AVE 0.61 0.50 0.74 0.67 0.82 
Note: All of the estimated standardized loadings are significant at p < 0.01. The composite 
reliability (CR) of the construct is calculated using the following formula: CRη = (Σλyi)2/[(Σλyi)2 
+ (Σεi)], where λyi is the standardized loading for scale item yi, and εi is the measurement error 
for the scale item yi (Fornell and Larcker 1981); whereas the average variance extracted (AVE) 
for each construct is calculated using the following formula: Vη = Σλyi2/(Σλyi2 + Σεi) (Gerbing 
and Anderson 1988).  
a Initially fixed at 1.0 for the purpose of estimation.  
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Table 2. Discriminant validity checks: Chi-square differences 
Constructs RSTAB ASPEC TFREQ CERTS 
ASPEC 197.60    
FREQ 217.65 75.18   
CERTS 211.63 136.57 89.11  
SCQUA 220.18 152.93 152.10 165.14 
 
Note: All of the Chi-sqaure differences between fixed and free two-factor confirmatory 
measurement models (all tests = 1 df) are significant at p < 0.01. 
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Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations 
Variable Mean S.D. RSTAB ASPEC TFREQ CERTS SCQUA 
RSTAB 4.17 0.74 1.00     
ASPEC 3.03 0.92 0.28 1.00    
TFREQ 2.13 0.89 0.19 0.43 1.00   
CERTS 2.65 0.89 0.28 0.17 0.37 1.00  
SCQUA 4.27 0.76 0.43 0.25 0.24 0.28 1.00 
Note: All of the constructs are measured on a five-point scale. All correlation coefficients are 
significant at p < 0.01. 
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Table 4. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis 
 Dependent variable: SCQUA 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Main Effect    
RSTAB 0.413*** 0.358*** 0.374*** 
Moderators    
ASPEC  0.050 0.056 
TFREQ  0.059 0.066 
CERTS  0.136*** 0.132*** 
Interaction Terms    
RSTAB х ASPEC   -0.020 
RSTAB х TFREQ   -0.020 
RSTAB х CERTS   0.123** 
Control variables    
Relationship age 0.088* 0.063 0.052 
Company size -0.028 -0.034 -0.034 
Business volume 0.104** 0.058 0.049 
    
Model F 21.802 14.463 10.729 
R2 0.206 0.233 0.245 
∆ R2 -- 0.027*** 0.012* 
Note: The entries in the table are standardized regression coefficients. The mean centering 
technique was used in Model 3 to remove multicollinearity between the predictors and the 
interactions containing these predictors. Coefficient significant at * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p 
< 0.01. 
 
